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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 960135-CA

:

Priority No. 2

V.
DWAYNE MARVIN CARLSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION ANP NATURE QF PRQCEEPINSS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of receiving
or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1316(2) (1993) (a copy of
the statute is attached as addendum A ) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court appropriately instruct the jury

concerning a permissive evidentiary presumption based on Utah
law?
This Court reviews the instructions given to the jury for
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court in giving

the instructions.

Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,

4 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App.
1993) . The instructions must be viewed as a whole to determine
whether they fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law.
Smoot. 293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4; Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3.
2.

Did the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument reach the

level of prosecutorial misconduct?
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this
Court must determine whether counsel's remarks called to the
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified
in considering in determining their verdict, and whether, under
the circumstances of this case, the effect of the remarks was
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that without the statements the result would have been
more favorable for the defendant.

State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750,

754-55 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); State
v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with receiving or transferring a
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1316 (2) (1993); giving false information to
a peace officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-506(1) (1995); license plate and registration card
violation, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-la-1305(1) (1993); and driving on a suspended license, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227
(1994) (R. 7-10).

At his trial on October 11, 1995, defendant

admitted under oath that he drove on a suspended license, gave
false information to the officer who stopped him, and had neither
a valid license plate a valid registration card at the time he
was stopped (R. 199, 220, 226-28, 230, 286). The jury was
instructed to render a verdict only as to the charge of receiving
a stolen motor vehicle, and, after a one-day trial, the jury
convicted him of the charge (R. 90, 120, 294). The remaining
counts were dismissed on the State's motion (R. 121, 294).
Defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison and a $10,000 fine (R. 145). The court stayed the
sentence and imposed 36 months probation, which included twelve
months in jail and miscellaneous recommendations (R. 145-46) .
3

Defendant appeals his conviction, challenging the trial
court's instructions to the jury and the prosecutor's closing
argument.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Near 8:00 p.m. on July 22, 1995, Officer John Sheets was on
patrol driving southbound near 2450 South Main Street in his
marked patrol car when he noticed a 1981 brown Mazda pickup in
the northbound lane being driven by defendant (R. 175-78).

The

Mazda was missing its front license and the officer decided to
turn around and stop the truck (R. 176). As the patrol car
turned around, and before the officer could activate his lights
or pull up behind the Mazda, defendant accelerated, cut through
the traffic, and turned onto a side street (R. 176, 186-87, 276).
The officer temporarily lost the truck and spent three minutes
cruising the area before finding it parked in a parking lot
behind a business at 233 0 South Main Street with defendant behind
the wheel (R. 176-77, 195). The officer pulled in behind the
Mazda, approached defendant, told him that he was being detained
because of the missing license plate, and asked for his driver's
license and registration (R. 177-78, 240). Defendant was acting
"very nervous" and admitted that he had neither with him (R. 178,
183, 188), while, in fact, defendant knew he was driving on a
4

suspended license and had not found any registration in the truck
(R. 178, 220, 226, 228, 230, 286). The officer then asked for
defendant's name, date of birth, and social security number (R.
178).

Defendant identified himself as "Steven Carlson", gave a

date of birth and social security number, and, as the officer was
writing down the information, suddenly declared, "This vehicle is
not stolen." (R. 178-79, 193-94).

The officer had not asked for

the information, had not mentioned anything about a stolen truck
to that point, did not notice any sign of forced entry into the
truck, and could see no reason for the outburst (R. 179, 187,
193-94, 231) .
When Officer Sheets called in the identifying information he
had received from defendant, he also asked for assistance (R.
180).

Sergeant Greg Carlson arrived about the time dispatch

informed Sheets that the social security number did not belong to
Steven Carlson (R. 180). Believing that defendant gave him a
false identity, Sheets arrested him and placed him in the patrol
car (R. 180, 191). He again asked for defendant's name, date of
birth and social security number, to which defendant responded
with "Marvin Carlson" and a different, albeit no less inaccurate,
date of birth and social security number (R. 180-81, 224-26).

5

While Officer Sheets checked the new information and learned
of its inaccuracy, Sergeant Carlson had dispatch check the
license plate on the back of the Mazda (R. 181, 196). He
discovered that the plate was registered to a Buick (R. 182) . He
then checked the vehicle identification number and discovered
that the Mazda had recently been reported stolen from Salt Lake
City (R. 182, 195). Upon hearing this information, Officer
Sheets read defendant his Miranda rights (R. 182). Defendant
said he understood his rights and agreed to speak to the officer
(R. 182-83, 219). Sheets specifically asked defendant where he
got the truck, to which defendant responded that he had "just
picked up the vehicle from a friend" whom he identified as Steve
Johnson (R. 183-84, 235) . Defendant mentioned no other name and
did not know how the officers could locate Johnson (R. 184).
Defendant surrendered the truck keys to Officer Sheets who
gave them to Sergeant Carlson (R. 185). Carlson stayed with the
truck until the owner, Steve Clark, arrived to recover it (R.
196).

Clark noticed that the camper shell from the back of the

truck was missing and that an after-market ignition had been
installed *to the side on the dash" which fit the key defendant
had given the officers (R. 166-67, 171-73, 191). Such an
ignition permits the car to be started
6

without using the

original ignition (R. 168, 171-72).

He testified that the truck

.had been taken from his used car lot on South Main Street, so
there were no plates on it at the time and the keys, which are
kept locked in the building, were left behind (R. 163-64, 167,
173) .
At trial, defendant testified, with varying degrees of
consistency, that he got the truck from a girl named Laura who
had dated his friend, Steve Johnson, years earlier (R. 207-08).
He claimed to have seen her trying to push-start the truck at
1:00 in the morning and stopped to help her (R. 207-09).

When

they could not get it started, she agreed to his offer of help
the next day and gave him the truck keys (R. 209-10).

He took

her to his friend's house and let the two of them borrow his car
to run errands while he went to bed (R. 210). When he woke up,
his friend told him that Laura had taken his car to go home and
change and would be back soon; however, she never returned (R.
211).

Defendant began looking for Laura, and, after a couple of

days, went to where they had left her Mazda in hopes that she had
gotten it fixed and left his car there (R. 212-13).

The Mazda

was still there, so defendant fixed it and used it to try to
locate his own car (R. 213-14, 216-17).

He claimed that nothing

about the truck looked suspicious or made him wonder if it was
7

stolen, and adamantly claimed that there was only one ignition in
the truck (R. 214-16, 237-38, 242),
Defendant said that at the time he was stopped by Officer
Sheets, he was on his way to apartments at 2360 South Main Street
because he had been told that Laura and his car might be there
(R. 217). After Officer Sheets stopped him, he lied to the
officer because he knew he was driving on a suspended license and
he had always been arrested for that in the past (R. 226-28).

He

claimed that he did not know that the truck was stolen until he
heard dispatch say so over the officer's radio (R. 217-18); only
then did he state that it was not stolen (R. 218). He testified
that he did not tell Sheets about Laura because he did not know
her last name, because Sheets was not interested in hearing
defendant's story after defendant had already lied to him, and
because Sheets was too busy gloating over the "big arrest" he had
made (R. 221-22, 236-37, 241-42).
Following his arrest, defendant contacted Steve Johnson who
said that Laura had moved, he did not know where she was, and he
had nothing to do with the truck (R. 212).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I; Defendant preserved only one of the many arguments
he makes on appeal challenging the trial court's use of a jury
8

instruction outlining an evidentiary presumption.

On the

preserved claim, defendant's assertion that the jury instruction
violates Utah statutory law because it includes language from
Title 76 in a prosecution under Title 41 is without merit because
the Utah Supreme Court has approved application of the general
principle articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) in
prosecutions under Title 41.
1986) (per curiam).

State v. Graves. 717 P.2d 717 (Utah

Further, regardless of the propriety of

including in the jury instruction reference to the presumption
that defendant stole the truck, confidence in the verdict is not
undermined because the facts the jury was required to find in
order to employ that presumption are the same facts required for
the jury to presume that defendant knew the truck was stolen,
irrespective of whether he stole it.

The absence of the language

relating to defendant's identity as the thief would not change
the evidence or the jury's ability to presume the requisite
knowledge based on the underlying facts, rendering it highly
unlikely that a different outcome would occur. Accordingly, any
error in including the statutory language would be harmless.
Because defendant made no objection on the remaining bases
advanced in his brief and does not argue manifest injustice, this
Court should refuse to review his remaining allegations.
9

Should

this Court reach the merits of the unpreserved allegations, it
will find that the instruction meets federal due process
requirements and complies with Utah statutory and case law.
Point II: The prosecutor's remarks in his rebuttal closing
argument did not urge the jury to consider matters outside the
evidence, but properly urged the jury to use their common sense
in deliberating on defendant's testimony.

The remarks

demonstrated the implausibility of defendant's position and, when
read in context, sought no more than was appropriate from the
jury.

Further, the remarks were not prejudicial where, even

without them, there was sufficient compelling evidence to support
the determination that defendant knew the truck was stolen.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT PRESERVED ONLY ONE OF HIS CHALLENGES TO THE
PRESUMPTION INSTRUCTION, AND FAILS TO ASSERT ANY
MANIFEST INJUSTICE ARGUMENT FOR HIS REMAINING POINTS;
ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT MAY REFUSE TO REACH THE MERITS
OF HIS UNPRESERVED CLAIMS; ADDITIONALLY, THE PRESERVED
ARGUMENT FAILS IN LIGHT OF STATE V. GRAVES AND BECAUSE
NO HARM AROSE FROM THE LANGUAGE IN THE INSTRUCTION
huu

Introduction

Over an objection by defendant, the trial court gave the
following instruction to the jury:

10

Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown
by the evidence in the case, that the person in
possession of the stolen property stole the property
and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in
possession of property, (2) that the property was
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been
given or appears from the evidence, then you may infer
from those facts and find that the defendant stole the
property and knew the property was stolen.
(R. 110, attached as addendum B).

Defendant challenges this

instruction on appeal as violative of constitutional, statutory
and case law.

Appellant's Br. at 11-28.

He claims that the

instruction: 1) violated Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995),
because it is based in part on Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995)
dealing with theft and he was not charged with theft or larceny,
and because the remainder of the presumption has no basis in the
Utah Code or other penal statute and, hence, cannot be given to a
jury (Appellant's Br. at 12-13); 2) should not have been given to
the jury because the presumption is for the judge's use in
determining whether the state's evidence is sufficient to warrant
submission to a jury (id. at 13-17); 3) unconstitutionally shifts
the burden of proof from the State to the defendant (id. at 1711

24); 4) is erroneous because it is both irrational and arbitrary
(id. at 25-26) ; and 5) prejudiced defendant by permitting the
jury to believe that it could convict him based either on his
mere presence in the vehicle or on a belief that he "should have
been charged with stealing'7 (id. at 26-28) .

IL.

Defendant Failed To Preserve All But One Of His Arguments
For Appeal
This Court should reach the merits of only one of

defendant's arguments in the first point of his brief because the
remainder of his arguments are presented for the first time on
appeal.

The record reflects that defendant made the following

objection to the relevant jury instruction below:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We're also objecting, your
Honor, to the state's instruction and it's not
numbered, so I will just briefly read it . . . [counsel
reads the instruction]. . .
Your Honor, I think that instruction is based on
[section] 76-6-402. [Section] 76-6-402 does create a
presumption. It creates a presumption that possession
of property recently stolen is prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
Mr. Carlson is not being charged with theft of
this vehicle. He's being charged under the Motor
Vehicle Code. He's being charged with possession of a
stolen vehicle knowing that it was stolen.
The first part of 76-6-402 states that the
following presumption shall be applicable to this part,
and it is the defense's position that it does not apply
to other parts of the code and therefore -12

THE COURT: The Court is -- the case that was
submitted by both counsel, the Court dealt with the
instruction -- what's the case citation?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's State versus Graves,
your Honor.
[PROSECUTOR]: 717 Pacific 2d. 717.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's correct.
THE COURT: Based on the Court's reading of that
case, your objection is noted but overruled.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay, and your Honor, just let
me state for the record briefly and I won't try to take
up too much time on this, but I need to make a
satisfactory record for appeal, that it's the defense's
position that State versus Graves does not apply to
this case because it was the -- the issue raised on
appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to
convict. That's what the defendant argued. He did not
at trial in the Graves case offer any explanation as to
why he had possession of the stolen vehicle.
What the Court in this case did is they said,
well, 76-6-402 articulates a general presumption of
law. Well, not a presumption but a general principle
is the word that they used, and because it could be
inferred by reasonable people that the defendant did
not explain -- give any explanation why he had the
stolen vehicle, that there was not necessarily
insufficient evidence to convict, and I don't think
that this case ever even addressed the issue of whether
or not a jury instruction would be applicable in this
particular case and'so I do not believe that it's on
point.
THE COURT: Your objection is respectfully
overruled. The Court relies on the case cited.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, your Honor.
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(R. 267-69, attached as addendum C).

It is clear that

defendant's objection below was two-fold: 1) the presumption did
not apply because defendant was not charged under Title 76; and
2) State v. Graves. 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), is not
controlling case law.

Defendant presents only the former

argument on appeal. Appellant's Br., Point IA, first paragraph
and a half, pp. 12-13.

None of the remaining arguments in

defendant's opening brief are included within the reasonable
scope of the objections made below.

Because defendant failed to

provide the trial court with an opportunity to address the
remainder of his appellate arguments in the first instance, this
Court need not reach any of those arguments for the first time on
appeal.

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (where a party fails to object to

an instruction "before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection [,]" the appellate court will consider error only to
avoid "manifest injustice"); State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 63
(Utah 1993) (refusing to consider for the first time on appeal an
objection to a jury instruction not raised at trial); State v.
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1226 n.9 (Utah App.) (refusing to consider
for the first time on appeal several objections to a jury
instruction), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
14

Defendant fails to acknowledge that the arguments have not
been preserved and does not argue manifest injustice or plain
error.

State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 n.l (Utah App. 1991)

(equating the term "manifest injustice" with the "plain error"
standard).

Accordingly, this Court should refuse to address the

defendant's unpreserved arguments.

See State v. Becker. 803 P.2d

1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990) (refusing to address the question of
manifest injustice where defendant failed to present an argument
on manifest injustice); cf• Pascual. 804 P.2d at 554 n.l
(addressing an issue raised for the first time on appeal because
defendant presented it as one of "plain error").
£^

Defendant's Preserved Argument Fails Because The Utah
Supreme Court Has Approved Application of the Challenged
Presumption To A Prosecution Under Title 41: Further. In

Tftig C^se, N Q ffcrm Arose From The Lftngvege Used In The
Instruction
Defendant claims that the instruction violates Utah
statutory law because it includes the language of section 76-6402(1) that permits the jury to presume that he stole the truck,
and he was not charged with theft or larceny under that part of
the code.1 Appellant's Br. at 12-13.

However, as the trial

defendant combines this preserved argument with an
unpreserved argument regarding state statutory law (addressed
infjCS/ Point ID2) . Appellant's Br. at 12-13. Together, these
arguments present defendant's sole challenge to that part of the
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court found, the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), disposes of this
complaint (R. 268).
In Graves, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which he was convicted of possession of a stolen
vehicle in violation of section 41-1-112, i.e., whether the
State established that he knew the vehicle was stolen. Graves,
717 P.2d at 717.

In affirming the conviction and sentence, the

Utah Supreme Court determined that the presumption stated in
section 76-6-402(1) articulated a general principle which
encompassed the inference of guilty knowledge from unexplained or
unsatisfactorily explained possession of stolen goods.
717-18.

Id. at

Although it was not reviewing a jury instruction, the

Court based its decision in large part on the United States
Supreme Court's approval of such a jury instruction in Barnes v.
United States. 412 U.S. 837, 839-40, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 2360 (1973),
and noted a number of cases in which our supreme court has

instruction permitting a presumption that he stole the vehicle.
See id. at 12-13 & 14 n.3 (explaining that the alleged error in
inclusion of the presumption that he stole the vehicle "is
obvious and merits no further discussion"). Consequently, should
this Court proceed to review the merits of defendant's
unpreserved claims, it need not be concerned with the inclusion
of this part of the instruction.
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"accepted approvingly the inference as a factor in proving
guilt".

Graves, 717 P.2d at 717-18 (emphasis added). Our Court

in essence said that, with the presumption which arises from the
evidence, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have
convicted defendant; in other words, the jury was able to use the
inference as a factor in establishing defendant's guilt.
Consequently, although Graves did not involve a jury instruction
challenge, it is clear from Graves that the presumption is a
factor which the finder of fact must have at its disposal in
making its ultimate determination of guilt.

Moreover, the Court

noted that, despite the absence of a specific provision in Title
41 reflecting the evidentiary presumption, the general principle
applied in a prosecution under Title 41 without offense to the
federal constitution.

Id. at 717. Based on Graves, the use of

the presumption instruction generally in a prosecution under
Title 41 to guide the jury in determining defendant's knowledge
that the vehicle was stolen does not warrant reversal of
defendant's conviction.
The question becomes whether use in the instruction of
language permitting an inference that defendant stole the vehicle
constitutes reversible error when such a finding is not necessary
to convict defendant of receiving or transferring a stolen motor
17

vehicle.

Defendant complains that use of the language violates

section 76-1-503 because the State did not present evidence to
support the presumption.2

Appellant's Br. at 12-13.

However,

this Court need not review the propriety of defendant's
interpretation of section 76-1-503 or decide whether inclusion of
the language constituted error because any error would not
require reversal under the circumstances of this case.
An error is harmless where

wx

there is no reasonable

likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.'"

State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 958 (Utah App.

1993) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).
Reversal is required only when the likelihood of a different
outcome is "sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the
verdict."

Villarreal, 857 P.2d at 958 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, defendant must establish that absent the language in
the instruction relating to the presumption that he stole the
vehicle, there is a sufficiently high likelihood that the jury's
verdict would have been different so that confidence in the
verdict is undermined.

2

For the text of section 76-1-503, see infra, page 33.
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Not only does defendant's prejudice argument fail to meet
this burden (Appellant's Br. at 26-28), but it is highly unlikely
that the jury would have acquitted defendant absent the
challenged language where both the taking and the knowledge
inferences arise from the same underlying facts. To presume that
defendant stole the truck, the jury would necessarily have to
find each of the underlying facts beyond a reasonable doubt: that
defendant was in possession of recently stolen property at a
point in time not too remote from the theft with no satisfactory
explanation for his possession.
(1995).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503

Had the jurors found those facts, they were also

entitled to find that he knew the truck was stolen, irrespective
of whether he stole it.

See Barnes, 93 S. Ct. at 2360, 2362-63

(approving use of a similarly-worded jury instruction raising a
presumption of knowledge upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
the underlying facts); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995)
(requiring that the State prove each element of a charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt); see also language of jury instruction
in addendum B.

The absence of the language relating to defendant

stealing the truck would not change the fact that defendant
admitted his possession of the truck, that defendant did not
contest the fact that the truck was recently stolen, and that the
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jury rejected as unsatisfactory his explanation for his
possession of the truck.

Inasmuch as the jury would still have

been entitled to infer the requisite knowledge to convict
defendant absent the language presuming that he stole the truck,
confidence in the verdict is not undermined.
Moreover, to the extent the presumption was used by the
jury, it was necessarily used to find the knowledge element where
the evidence adduced below clearly related to defendant's
knowledge that the truck was stolen, not his identity as the
thief.

The challenged instruction permitted an inference that

defendant knew the truck was stolen based on unexplained or
unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen
property. The evidence was undisputed that defendant possessed
the stolen vehicle, that it had been stolen from two to five days
prior to his arrest, and that defendant knew he did not own it
(R. 164, 176-78, 183-84, 207, 222-23). Testimony established that
the truck had been stolen without the keys (R. 167, 173), that
when it was recovered it had a secondary or after-market ignition
switch on the dash which bypassed the original ignition, and that
the key defendant ultimately returned with the truck fit the new
ignition (R. 167-68, 171-73, 191). Further, defendant claimed
that the woman he had first seen with the stolen truck had stolen
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defendant's own car about eight days before his arrest (R. 175,
207, 211-12, 217) .
The instruction also provided that the jury should consider
the "surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case"
in determining whether to employ the inference (R. 110, Addendum
B).

Those circumstances, including defendant's own actions, do

not support use of the inference that he stole the truck, but
lend additional support to the jury's ability to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite knowledge to be
guilty of receiving stolen property.

Before Officer Sheets

showed any interest in defendant specifically, defendant acted to
avoid him by accelerating, cutting through traffic, and turning
down a side street (R. 176, 186-87).

This reasonably suggests

that as soon as defendant noticed the patrol car making a u-turn,
he had a reason to believe that the officer was focused on him.
He knew nothing about the missing license plate at the time (R.
233), claimed he didn't know the back plate didn't go to the
truck (R. 240), and did not explain how the suspended license or
outstanding warrant would have triggered the officer's interest
when the officer didn't know his identity.

The jury was free to

conclude that defendant's actions resulted from his knowledge
that he had no registration for the vehicle and no permission
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from the rightful owner--either Steve Clark or, as defendant
claimed, "Laura"--to drive or possess it. That his actions were
not merely coincidental with the timing of the officer's u-turn
is supported by the evidence that, after accelerating, cutting
through traffic, and turning down a side street, defendant was
found three minutes later in the parked truck behind a business
at 2330 South Main Street (R. 176-77, 195), despite his testimony
that he was on his way to apartments at 2360 South Main Street
where he expected to find both Laura and his car after an eightday search (R. 207, 212, 217). Despite defendant's explanations
for his actions, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant
acted to avoid the officer because he knew that the truck was
stolen, suspected that the officer might be looking for it, and
wanted to avoid being found by the officer.
Further, when defendant was stopped by police and asked for
identifying information, he not only provided a false name, two
false dates of birth, and a false social security number (R. 17881, 224-26), but spontaneously volunteered the statement, "This
vehicle is not stolen" before the officers voiced any concern
about the truck (R. 178-79).

When asked thereafter where he got

the truck, defendant told the officer a sequence of events
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inconsistent with the explanation he gave at trial (Compare R.
183-84, 221 with R. 207-14, 217, 236-37).
Finally, the instruction requires that the jury evaluate
defendant's explanation for his possession of the truck before it
may utilize the inference (R. 110, Addendum B) .3 Defendant
testified that he had the truck only because Laura had taken his
own car, and he was using what he believed was her truck to find
her.

He explained that he happened upon Laura--a girl he knew

had dated his friend Steve Johnson in the past — and the
inoperable truck several days before his arrest (R. 207-08, 217).
Laura told him that the truck belonged to her and Johnson (R.
222).

After trying unsuccessfully to fix the problem, defendant

offered to work on the truck the next day, got the keys from
Laura, and drove her to Doug Haycock's house (R. 209-10).
Defendant let Laura and Doug take his car while he went to bed,
only to find later that Laura had taken his car and never

3

This does not act to shift from the State the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that the
property was stolen, as defense counsel expressly informed the
jury in this case (R. 288). Barnes. 98 S. Ct. at 2362 n.9
(recognizing that while the jury must weigh defendant's
explanation before utilizing the inference, the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Mid have knowledge that
the property was stolen, an essential element of the crime,
remains on the government").
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returned (R. 210-11).

Defendant claims that he looked for her,

ultimately going to where they had left the truck, fixing it, and
using it in his search for his own car (R. 212-17).

However, he

admitted that he did not contact the truck's alleged co-owner,
Steve Johnson, to find Laura until after he'd looked for both
Laura and his car for several days, and even then it was only
after his arrest that he spoke to Johnson (id.).
Both parties noted below that defendant's credibility
factored heavily into the jury's final determination (R. 202,
272).

The credibility determination was made in the face of

several inconsistent statements defendant made at trial (Compare
R. 226-28 with R. 227, 229-30, 239; R. 207-10 with R. 221-22,
236; R. 227 with R. 228; R. 218, 231 with R. 232-33; R. 212 with
R. 175, 207, 211-12, 217). Witness credibility is a
determination for the jury, State v. Hayes. 860 P.2d 968, 872-73
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 852 (Utah
App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), and the jury here
rejected defendant's version of the events as incredible.
Further, defendant has not attacked the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction, eliminating even that limited
review of the credibility determination below.
Garrett. 849 P.2d at 582.
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See, e.g..

Because the evidence relates to defendant's knowledge that
the truck was stolen and does not tend to establish his identity
as the thief, any error from inclusion of the language when
defendant was not charged with theft or larceny is harmless and
does not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction.

State v.

Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329# 1331-32 (Utah 1989) (finding an erroneous
intoxication instruction to be harmless error as the outcome was
not likely to be different in light of the evidence).

Cf. United

States v. Pineda-Ortuno. 952 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding harmless error in a firearm instruction which included
forms of the word "use" instead of "carry" where the evidence
related solely to the carrying of firearms), cert, denied 504
U.S. 28, 112 S. Ct. 1990 (1992).

IL.

Ag T Q The Merits Of Defendant's Unpreservect claims, The
Instruction Fully Comports With Federal And State Law And
Neither Constitutes Error Nor Affects The Substantial Rights
Of h Party
Should this Court proceed to review the merits of

defendant's unpreserved claims, it will find the claims to be
unpersuasive because the challenged instruction comports with
both federal and state law# does not constitute error, and does
not affect defendant's substantial rights.
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1,

Federal Constitutional Law

Defendant challenges the instruction as a due process
violation under the federal constitution because it allegedly
removes the State's responsibility for establishing the mental
culpability for the charged crime or shifts the burden to
defendant to disprove his mental culpability.4
at 17-24.

Appellant's Br.

Additionally, he claims that the instruction is

irrational because it requires that the jury find that he knew
the truck was stolen simply based on his possession of the truck
and that his possession is without any rational connection to the
presumption that he knew the truck was stolen.

Id. at 24-26.

The latter claim misapprehends the instruction. By its
terms, the instruction requires the jury to base its decision not
only on defendant's possession of the truck, but also on the
timing of his possession, the satisfactory nature of his
explanation for that possession, and the "surrounding
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case" (R. 110,

^Although defendant also suggests that the instruction
violates the state constitution, he does not seek a separate
state constitutional analysis, instead claiming that the Utah
Constitution applies with the same force--and apparently under
the same analysis--as the federal constitution. Appellant's Br.
at 18 n.5. Accordingly, no independent analysis under Utah's
constitution is necessary.
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Addendum B).

As explained in subsection C, supra, the evidence

on these points supports use of the knowledge inference, not use
of the stealing inference.

Further, the jury was required to

find each of the underlying facts giving rise to the presumption
of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 110). Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-1-501 and -503 (1995).

Defendant's contention that the

challenged instruction required less of the jury is without
support.
Moreover, the presumption or inference reflected in the
challenged instruction represents a general legal principle which
"does not offend the federal constitution."

Graves, 717 P.2d at

717 (relying on Barnes v. United States. 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct.
2357 (1973)).

This legal principle is based on centuries-old

common law, and has enjoyed "longstanding and consistent judicial
approval" throughout its existence.

Barnes. 93 S. Ct. at 2362;

Graves/ 717 P.2d at 718.
Official acceptance of this legal principle under the
federal constitution pre-dates defendant's challenge by more than
two decades.

In Barnes. the United States Supreme Court upheld a

jury instruction similar to the one challenged here.

In doing

so, the Supreme Court reviewed four of its earlier decisions,
three of which defendant relies on in this case to argue that
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there is no rational connection between his mere possession of
the truck and the presumption that he knew it was stolen. Turner
v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S. Ct. 642 (1970); Leary v.
United States. 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969); United States
Vr Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S. Ct. 279 (1965); and United States
v. Gainey. 380 U.S. 63, 85 S. Ct. 754 (1965).

The Court held

that these cases, in the aggregate, establish that
if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as
sufficient to support conviction satisfies the
reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence
necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a
rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a
reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not
standard, then it clearly accords with due process.
93 S. Ct. at 2361-62. The Court determined that the same may be
said of both statutory and common-law inferences, id. at 2362,
and went on to find that the inference, as used in Barnes.
satisfied the due process requirements of the federal
constitution.

Id. at 2363.

Analyzed under that test, the instruction in this case also
satisfies federal due process requirements.

Without a

satisfactory explanation from defendant for his possession of the
truck, the aggregate of the undisputed evidence, defendant's
admissions, actions, and statements, his credibility, and the
surrounding circumstances generally, as set forth in subsection
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C, supra. combine to permit a rational juror to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the truck was stolen (R. 110, Addendum B).

Barnes, 98

S. Ct. at 2361-62. Accordingly, the inference satisfies the
reasonable doubt standard and meets federal due process
requirements.

Id. at 2361-63.

While the practical effect of the overall jury instruction
is to shift to defendant the burden of going forward with the
evidence, such a shift is permissible in the case of this
specific inference because the inference satisfies the
reasonable-doubt standard.

Id. at 2363 n.ll (relying on Tot v.

United States. 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241 (1943)) (recognizing
that because of the "longstanding and consistent judicial
approval" the inference has received over the centuries and
because the inference satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard,
u

there will certainly be a rational connection between the fact

presumed or inferred (in this case, knowledge) and the facts the
Government must prove in order to [permissibly] shift the burden
of going forward (possession of recently stolen property).").
Accordingly, under the federal constitution, the challenged
instruction neither violates due process requirements nor
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unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof from the State, and
defendant's assertions to the contrary are without merit.

2, Utah's Statutory Law
Defendant challenges the instruction as violative of state
statutory law because the instruction involves a common law
presumption that defendant knew the property was stolen, which
presumption is not "'established by this code or other penal
statute'" as he claims is required by section 76-1-503.
Appellant's Br. at 12 (quoting section 76-1-503).

The short

answer to this challenge is to point to the Utah Supreme Court's
determination that section 76-6-402(1) articulates the general
principle which includes not only the presumption that defendant
stole property, but the presumption that defendant knew the
property was stolen, and to emphasize that the latter presumption
has been approvingly used in establishing guilt in a number of
cases.

Graves, 717 P.2d at 717-18.

It should be noted, however, that defendant's argument is
based on a misinterpretation of section 76-1-503.

Instead of

requiring that a presumption be established by state statute
before it may be given to a jury (Appellant's Br. at 12), the
statute simply explains the consequences arising from the giving
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of evidentiary presumptions which in fact appear in Utah's Code.
In its entirety, the statute provides:
An evidentiary presumption established by this
code or other penal statute has the following
consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support
the presumption exist, the issue of the
existence of the presumed fact must be
submitted to the jury unless the court is
satisfied that the evidence as a whole
clearly negates the presumed fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the
existence of a presumed fact to the jury, the
court shall charge that while the presumed
fact must on all evidence be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts
giving rise to the presumption as evidence of
the presumed fact.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995) .

Because "both" presumptions

identified by defendant are encompassed in the same general
principle articulated in Utah law in section 76-6-402(1), Graves,
717 P.2d at 717, then the consequences detailed in section 76-1503 would apply and would support the giving of the instruction
in this case.
Subsection 1 requires that the trial court submit the
presumption to the jury when evidence of the facts supporting the
presumption has been introduced and the court does not believe
that the evidence "clearly negates the presumed fact [.]"

The

presumption required evidence relating to defendant's possession
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of stolen property, the period between the time of the theft and
defendant's possession, and defendant's explanation of his
possession.

Evidence on each of these points was provided at

trial in this case.

See supra. Point IC. Accordingly, evidence

of the facts underlying the presumption challenged by defendant-that he knew the property was stolen--was introduced.

Further,

nothing in either the record or defendant's brief suggests that
the trial court believed that the evidence negated the
presumption in the instruction.

The trial court's rejection of

defendant's challenge to the instruction reasonably suggests that
the court felt the evidence warranted use of the presumption (R.
268, Addendum C).

Hence, subsection 1 was met and required that

the challenged presumption be submitted to the jury.
Once it is decided that the presumption should go to the
jury, subsection 2 requires that the court inform the jury that
u

the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt" and that the facts supporting the presumption
are legally regarded as being evidence of the presumed fact. The
challenged instruction met this requirement by stating that the
presumption could arise only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of each of the outlined supporting facts win light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in this case,"
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and that, upon establishment of each supporting fact beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury could legally presume that defendant
knew the property was stolen (R. 110, Addendum B).

Further,

several other instructions repeatedly informed the jury that the
elements of the offense must be found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt (R. 101, 105, 112). Accordingly, the
requirements of section 76-1-503 were met, and defendant's claim
that the instruction violates this code section is without merit.

2L* Utah's Case Law
Finally, defendant argues that Utah case law provides that
the presumption contained in section 76-6-402(1) is addressed
only to the trial court for use in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case, and that
instructing the jury on the presumption constitutes error.
Appellant's Br. at 13-17.
While the statutory presumption is to be used by the trial
court when necessary to determine the sufficiency of the State's
prima facie case, State V, Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Utah
1985), it is not limited to that use.

The Utah Supreme Court has

repeatedly held:
'The statute, properly construed, is directed to the
court. . . . [T]he statute provides a standard by which
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence for
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submitting the case to the
properly be used to defeat
the State has, as a matter
a prima facie case against

jury. The statute may
a claim by a defendant that
of law, failed to establish
the defendant.'

Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326-27 (citations omitted); see al££ State
v. Pacheco. 712 P.2d 192, 194-95 (Utah 1985) (the statute is
directed to the court for determining whether the evidence
warrants submission of the case to the jury), cert, denied, 479
U.S. 813, 107 S. Ct. 64 (1986); State v. Asay. 631 P.2d 861, 864
(Utah 1981) (the statute deals with the sufficiency of the
evidence to go to the jury, which is a matter for the court);
State v. Crowder. 197 P.2d 917, 921 (Utah 1948) (while the
statute "determines for the court what evidence is sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case . . . it does not require the court
to instruct the jury that such facts constitute a prima facie
case").

This does not mean that the jury is not to be given the

presumption, where appropriate, for use in its deliberations-only that they should not be instructed to make a determination
about the State's prima facie case.

State v. Perez. Case No.

950333-CA, slip op. at 7-8 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996) (approving
of a jury instruction on the statutory presumption which omits
the criticized "prima facie" language and emphasizes the
permissible nature of the presumption); State v. Johnson. 745
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P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) (instructing the jury on the statutory
presumption is permissible so long as the prima facie language of
the statute is not used); State v. Smith. 726 P.2d 1232, 1235-36
(Utah 1986) (although instructing the jury in the statutory
language is error, such error is harmless where explanatory
instructions made clear that the jury faced a permissible
inference); Chambers. 709 P.2d at 327 (a jury instruction
instructing the jury in terms of "prima facie" is erroneous as it
could only be confusing and might lead to inappropriate
conclusions); Crowder. 197 P.2d at 921 (it is error to instruct
the jury on the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1503 (1995) (evidentiary presumptions based on Utah statutes must
be given to the jury in appropriate instances).
The giving of the challenged instruction was recently upheld
by a panel of this court in State v. Perez, Case No. 950333-CA,
slip op. at 7-8 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996).

The Perez instruction

is identical to the challenged one in this case except for three
points: 1) the challenged instruction uses the words "the
property" where the Perez instruction uses "it"; 2) the
instruction in this case uses an additional phrase not contained
in the Perez instruction; and 3) the challenged instruction uses
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the word "those" where the Perez instruction used "these."

The

instruction in both cases, with the two differences in brackets,
provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from
which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in
light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence
in the case, that the person in possession of the stolen
property stole the property and knew that it [the property]
was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of
property, (2) that the property was stolen, (3) that such
possession was not too remote in point of time from the
theft, and (4) that no satisfactory explanation [of such
possession has been given or] appears from the evidence,
then you may infer from these [those] facts and find that
the defendant stole the property and knew the property was
stolen.
(R. 110, Addendum B).

Perez, slip op. at 7 (emphasis omitted).

The Perez instruction was upheld as a permissible inference which
eliminated the impermissible "prima facie" term, emphasized the
fact finder's discretion, and did not impermissibly shift the
burden of proof to defendant.

Id. at 8.

The latter point was

emphasized in this case by defense counsel in his closing
argument when she expressly reiterated that the phrase "may
infer" means exactly what it says: the State continued to carry
"the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the [defendant]
knew or had reason to know that that [sic] truck was stolen[,]"
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and the ''instruction doesn't shift that burden suddenly back" on
defendant (R. 287-88).

Accordingly, the essentially identical

instruction in this case is in full compliance with Utah case
law, and defendant's argument to the contrary is without merit.
Perez, slip op. at 6-7; Smith. 726 P.2d at 1234-36.

POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING REMARKS DID NOT SUGGEST A NONEVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR A VERDICT AND, IN ANY EVENT,
RESULTED IN NO PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT
In his rebuttal closing remarks, the prosecutor touched on
points defense counsel had made in her closing argument, outlined
the evidence supporting a determination that defendant knew that
the truck was stolen, then closed with the following argument:
[PROSECUTOR:] Well, members of the jury, I submit
to you that if after this case is all over you walk out
to the parking lot and you discovered that somebody has
stolen your vehicle, and two or three days go by and
all of a sudden as you're driving down the road, you
see your vehicle and you see Mr. Carlson driving that
vehicle, and you pull him over and stop him and you say
to him, "What are you doing in my vehicle?" -[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I object to this
part of the argument.
THE COURT: It's appropriate argument.

Go ahead.

[PROSECUTOR]: And you say to him, "What are you
doing in my vehicle?"
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And he says to you, "Steve Johnson gave me this
vehicle," I submit to you there isn't one of you that
would let him go, that would simply let him walk away.
What you would do is call the police or you'd hang
on to him yourself and yet, that's exactly what the
defense is asking you to do in this case, to let him go
because he comes in to this courtroom and tells you
that the story he gave Officer Sheets when he pulled
him over was that somebody just gave him this vehicle.
Well, members of the jury, I submit that you
wouldn't buy it if you were in that situation, and I
submit also that you shouldn't buy it in this case.
I'm not saying the defendant stole the vehicle, but
what we are saying was that he was in possession of a
stolen motor vehicle and he knew or had reason to
believe it was stolen.
(R. 293-94) (a copy of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument is
attached as addendum E ) .
Defendant claims that this portion of the prosecutor's
closing remarks constitute misconduct because it was not based on
the evidence and improperly urged the jurors to put themselves in
the position of the victim to decide the verdict.
Br. at 28-31.
the

wx

Appellant's

The effect, he claims, was prejudicial because of

less than compelling proof" of his mental culpability in

this case.

Id. at 29-31.

The trial court's response was that

"the argument was a reasonable inference of the facts and . . .,
although a little pointed, was not unduly inflammatory" (R. 295)
(attached in addendum E ) .
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The two prong test for determining whether a prosecutor has
engaged in misconduct and whether reversal is warranted is well
established.

The defendant must show that: 1) "the actions or

remarks of (the prosecutor) call to the attention of the jury a
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining
its verdict[;]" and 2) Munder the circumstances of the particular
case, . • . the error is substantial and prejudicial such that
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there
would have been a more favorable result."

State v. Tenney, 913

P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah App.) (quotations omitted), cert, denied.
923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); £££ State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Moreover, counsel on both sides are given considerable latitude
in their closing arguments.

"They have the right to fully

discuss from their perspective the evidence and all inferences
and deductions it supports."

State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221,

1225 (Utah 1989) .
The challenged remarks are a logical interpretation of the
evidence from the prosecution's perspective and demonstrate for
the jury the implausibility of defendant's justification for his
claimed ignorance that the truck was stolen.

The comment did not

suggest that the jury had uan obligation to convict . . . on some
39

basis other than solely on the evidence."

state v. Andreaann.

718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986) (urging the jury to convict
defendants because they "are not the only ones here and they are
not the only ones we need to be concerned about.").

Instead, the

prosecutor simply urged the jury to use some common sense

when

evaluating the defendant's explanation as to how he came to be
driving a truck belonging to Steve Clark and never suspected that
it was stolen, despite the presence of a second ignition, the
absence of the front license plate and the registration, and the
fact that he obtained it from a woman who had already allegedly
stolen defendant's own car. While common sense is not a
replacement for the trial court's instructions, "it is a timehonored, wholly compatible part of the deliberative, decisionmaking process."

State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah

1989) .
Further, the prosecutor's comments were not prejudicial.
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct
or remark will not be presumed prejudicial."
P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted).

State v. Troy. 688
In cases where the

proof is less compelling, "this Court will more closely
scrutinize the conduct."

Id.

The evidence against defendant in

40

this case was very compelling, despite defendant's attempt to
portray it as weak.

See discussion of facts, supra. Point IC.

Given this evidence, there is little likelihood that, even
absent the prosecutor's challenged remarks--which emphasized the
incredibility of defendant's story by asking the jurors simply to
use common sense when viewing it--the jury would have acquitted
defendant.

Because the prosecutor's remarks, read in context,

sought no more than was appropriate from the jury and resulted in
no prejudice to defendant, defendant's claim of prosecutorial
misconduct must fail.

Cummins. 839 P.2d at 852-53; State v.

Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this d?Y

day of October, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty.
It is a second degree felony for a person:
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully
taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of
his duty.
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, t 115; C. 1943,
57-3a-116; L. 1989, ch. 274, * 23; C. 1953,
41-1-112; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1,
t 173.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, inserted "second
degree" before "felony" at the end of the section, and made stylistic changes.

The 1992 amendment, effective January 30,
1992, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 41-1*112; inserted the subsection designations; substituted "motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three
places; and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.
Possession

of

property

recently

stolen,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that
the

person

in possession

of

the

stolen

property

stole

the

property and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of property, (2)
that the property was stolen, (3) that such possession was not
too remote in point of time from the theft, and

(4) that no

satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the
property was stolen.

OOOJio

ADDENDUM C

THE COURT:

That is the one the Court will give.

Your objection->is\noted.
Next?
MS.? HYDE: Thank you, .your Honor.
We're also objecting/ your Honor, to the state's
instruction and it's not numbered, so I will just briefly
read it so Ircan refer to it, that possession of property
recently stolen,:, if .not.-satisfactorily explained, is
ordinarily

a circumstance„from which you may reasonably

draw the inference and find in light of the surrounding
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case that the
person in possession

of the stolen property, stole the

property and knew.that the property was stolen, thus if you
find from the-evidence - and beyond a reasonable doubt, one,
that the defendant was in possession of property, two, that
the property was stolen, three, that such possession was not
too remote in point of time from the theft, and four, that
no satisfactory explanation of such possession has been
given or appears from the evidence, you may infer from those
facts and find that the-defendant stole the property and
knew that the property was stolen*
Your Honor, I think that instruction is based on
76r-6-402«

76r-6*-402 does creates ..presumption* .It creates

a presumption .that possession of ...property recently stolen
is prima facie evidence that the,person.in possession stole

0 6 026V

1

the property.

2

M r . Carlson .is n o t b e i n g charged w i t h theft of this

3

vehicle.

4

He's being c h a r g e d w i t h possession o f a stolen v e h i c l e

5

knowing that it v a s s t o l e n ,

6

He's -being charged under t h e Motor V e h i c l e C o d e .

The - first ^part: o f 76-6-402 s t a t e s that t h e following]

7

presumption shall b e applicable t o t h i s p a r t , a n d i t is

8

the defense's position that i t does n o t apply t o o t h e r p a r t s

9

of the code a n d therefore

10

THE COURT:

—

The Court is —

the case that w a s

11

submitted by both c o u n s e l , t h e Court dealt with t h e instruc-

12

tioh —

what's t h e case citation?

13

MS.~HYDE:

14

MR. JONES:

717 Pacific 2d. 7 1 7 .

15 [

M S . HYDE:

That's c o r r e c t .

16

T H E COURT:

Based on the Court's reading of that

17
18

That's State versus G r a v e s , your H o n o r .

c a s e , your objection is noted b u t overruled.
MS. HYDE:

O k a y , a n d your H o n o r , just let m e state

19

for t h e record briefly a n d I =won Vt _ try _ to take u p t o o much

20

time..on t h i s , .but I ^need.to m a k e a .satisfactory record for

21

a p p e a l , that it's, the defense's position that State versus

22

Graves does n o t apply t o this case because it w a s t h e — the

23

issue raised o n appeal w a s whether there w a s sufficient

u

evidence"to-convict*

*5

He did not at trial in the Graves case offer any explanation

Thatfs what-the defendant argued*

^ v V & kj ij

as to why he had possession of the stolen vehicle.
What-the Court in' this case did is they said, well,
76-6-402 articulates a-general presumption of law.

Well,

not a presumption but a general principle is the word that
they used, and because it could be inferred by reasonable
people that the-defendant did not explain •— give any
explanation why he had the stolen vehicle, that there was not|
necessarily insufficient evidence to convict, and I don't
think that this case ever even addressed the issue of whetherl
or not a jury instruction would be applicable in this
particular case and so I do not believe that it's on point.
THE COURT:
ruled.

Your objection is respectfully over-

The Court relies on the case cited.
MS.r KYDE:
THE COURT:
MS. EYDE:

Thank you, your Honor.
Anything else?
I think that covers it, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.
thereupon, the jury entered the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

The record will reflect the presence

of the jury," both counsel ""-and the defendant,
:

The evidence has-been presented in its entirety.

The Court has:resolved-legal issues out of the presence of
the jury.

It is now, after both parties have rested, tine

for the Court.to instruct you on the law, invite argument
from counself" "and then submit' the case to the jury for their

000261;

ADDENDUM D

76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service
involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, i 76-6-402; 1974, ch. 32, { 16.

ADDENDUM E

1

•again,-.the .language says nay infer because, as I told you

2

before, it is-the-'prosecutor who has the burden of proving

3 J Dwayne — t h a t Dwayne is guilty of this offense*

It's the

4

prosecutor who has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable

5

doubt that he knew or"had reason to know that that truck

6

was stolen and this instruction doesn't shift that burden

7

suddenly back on Dwayne, and I wanted to point that out to

8

you because it' is"important.

9

* *

The reason why the prosecutor has the burden of

10

proving Dwayne's guilt is because a long time ago, the fore-

11

fathers of our constitution had experienced oppressive

12

government conduct.

13

accused/of a crime and hauled into court and then told,

14

okay, you prove to-us that you didn't do it, and how unfair

15

and unjust that w a s , and that was why it was decided that if

16

the state wishes to take someone's liberty, that they must

17

make the showing that they must prove beyond a reasonable

18

doubt that he is guilty, and ladies and gentlemen, Dwayne did

19

not know that that vehicle was stolen.

20

• They knew vhat it was like to be

He has made a~ lot of mistakes, mistakes that he will

21

pay for.

This was one i:hing he did not do, and I ask you

22

to return a verdict of not guilty.

23

THE COURT:-

24

Rebuttal?

25

MR. JONES:

Thank y o u , counsel.

You know,- the defendant or the defense

28

1

attorney says to you that her client was brutally honest

2

with you.:ii^ this courtroom, . Brutally honest in what respect?

3

; v

The real-question, you know, why did he lie to the

4

officer about his identity?

5

examination "The-reason I lied is I was on suspension and I

6

knew if I told the truth, I could be in trouble."

7

He said to you on direct

- And then on cross-examination we finally get him to

8

admit that that wasn't-the only reason that he lied to the

9

officer; it wasn f t just driving on suspension.

He finally

10

admitted to you that there was another reason.

It was

11

outstanding warrants for his arrest.

12

Does it seem to you like he's brutally honest when

13

the only way we find out that the reason he lied to this

14

officer was because of the warrants?

It didn't come from

15

the defendant on direct examination.

It came as a result of

16

cross-examination.

17

all, if he'd just got on.-the. stand and told his story, you

18

would never know that the reason he lied to the officer

19

didn't have to do just with driving on suspension, it had to

20

do with the outlanding warrants.

21

If I hadn't asked him any questions at

Can you honestly say that this man is brutally

22

honest with you when we find him in a lie on the witness

23

stand today, this afternoon?

24

with the officer at the time of this' incident in July and he

25

wasn't honest with you today in' this courtroom, and yet, the

He wasn't, brutally honest

29

1

2

defense -says you should believe him?

You should find him

h t o be .credible and -honest and truthful?

3

heard *frem fois representation?

4

5

After what you've

T submit-he's not'honest at all in this case.

He

lied tor offlfcer" Sheets and he lied t o you in this courtroom.

6

Next-the -defense attorney said, well, the defendant 1

7

mother has corroborated his' story.

8

mother testify. 'The only thing she corroborates is the fact

9

that this girl named Laura borrowed the defendant's Nissan.

Okay.

You heard his

10

The mother never said anything about the vehicle that was

11

stolen.

12

truck.

13

about this stolen vehicle, and so her testimony, I submit,

14

doesn't help you resolve the issue in this case because

15

the defendant's mother only talked about Laura and borrowing

16

the Nissan truck and that's not a critical issue in this

17

case.

18

defendant's Nissan.

19

a stolen motor vehicle and did he know or have reason to

20

believe it was stolen. 'That's: what we're asking you to

21

decide in this' case/ and yet, the mother talks about some-

22

thing that really doesn't help you resolve that question

23

at all.

24 J

25

She never testified at all about this Mazda pickup
I listened to her testimony.

Not one word from her

It doesn't make any difference if Laura borrowed the
The issue i s , was the defendant driving

Next the defense said, well, Troy corroborates the
story because"he -tells about'bringing a battery to the

30

1

defendant and again, so what?

2

battery to put

3

you decide.the issue of whether the defendant was in

4

possession of a stolen motor vehicle?

5

decide the question.of whether the defendant knew or had

6

reason to believe It was stolen?

7

that it helps you in -the-ultimate issue in this case.

8

Okay, Troy brings him a

i n t o this stolen vehicle.

Does that help

Does it help you to

Again, -I-just don't see

Next the defense said, -well, we put Josh on the

9

stand.

-Josh said he saw the ^defendant driving the. vehicle

10

for three or four days.- Okay.

11

three or four days.

12

ultimate issue in this case?

13

He was driving the vehicle

Again, does that help -you resolve the

Steve Clark said, "I noticed the vehicle was gone

14

on the/22nd.

15

tion is the last time I-saw the. vehicle was about two days

16

before."

17

recollection is the last time I saw it was two days earlier."

18

We called the police."

He said, "My recollec-

He said, "I've got 150 vehicles on the lot.

My

Again, does it m a k e any difference whether the

19

vehicle had been taken for two days or four days?

20

again, ,it really doesn't: help you resolve the ultimate issue

21

in this case, whether he

22

the 20th, whether h e had cit two days or four days.

23

I submit

had the car on the 18th of July or

The point i s , when 'the officer stops the. vehicle or

24

stops him getting out of. the. vehicle, he's in possession of

25

a stolen motor, vehicle on the 22nd of J u l y ,

I

31

1

The defense says, well, there's no evidence that

2

this vehicle was stolen.

3

was stolen.

4

No one would ever know that it

Well, there is evidence that someone would know

5. this was a stolen vehicle*

Number o n e , it's got a false

6

license plate on the back of the. vehicle, but number two,

7

probably most important is the fact that there was a

8

secondary ignition in the. vehicle.

9

didn't notice it.

Officer Sheets said he

The defendant categorically denies it's

10

there, but M r . Clark, the owner of the vehicle, I said to

11

him, "When you got the vehicle back that night sometime

12

after eight o'clock, did you notice anything?"

13

He said, "Yeah, the first thing I noticed is that

14

the camper shell was gone."

15

And I said, "Okay.

16

And he said, "Yeah, there was what's called an

17

Did you notice anything else?"

after market ignition."

18

Boy.

You'd have to be blind not to know that there'

19

something wrong with this, vehicle, and who is it that's

20

driving this, vehicle around?

21

key in this after action ignition, system?. It's this

22

defendant, and y e s , Officer Sheets didn't pick up on it,

23

but M r . Clark, the man who owns this, vehicle, did pick up

24

on it and it' tells you more^ than v anything else in this case

25

that whoever.'s driving this has got to either know or have

I

Who is it that's, putting the

32

1

reason to believe that they*re In

2

motor vehicle*

3

J

possession of a stolen

Well, .members of the jury,. • I submit to you that

4

if after .this case is -all-aover y o u walk out to the parking

5

lot and you discovered that somebody has stolen your

6

vehicle, and two,or three days go by and all of a sudden

7

as you're driving down the road, you see your vehicle and

8

you see M r . Carlson driving that vehicle, and you pull him

9

over and stop him and you say to him, "What are you doing in

10

my vehicle?"

11

—

M S . HYDE:

12

argument.

13

THE COURT:

14

Go ahead.

15

MR. JONES:

16
17

Your Honor, I object to this part of the

It's appropriate argument.

And you say to him, "What are you doing

in my vehicle?"
j

And he says to you, "Steve Johnson gave me this

18

vehicle," I submit

19

let him go, that would simply let him walk away.

20

to you there isn't one of you that would

What you would do is call the police or you'd hang

21

on to him yourself and yet, that's exactly what the

22

defense is asking you to do in this case, to let him go

23

because he comes in to this courtroom and tells you that the

24 j story he gave.Officer Sheets when he pulled him over was

25

that somebody just gave him this vehicle*

33

1

"Well, members of the jury f I submit that you

2

wouldn't buy it if you were in that, situation, and I submit

3

also that you shouldn't: buy it in this case.

4

the defendant stole the vehicle, but what we are saying

5

was that he was in possession of a stolen motor vehicle and

6

he knew or had reason to believe it was stolen.

7

Thank you.

8

THE COURT:

9

I'm not saying

The Clerk will swear the Bailiff.

(Whereupon, the Clerk administered the oath

10

to the Bailiff.)

11

THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen, two matters.

The

12

verdict form will only apply to the question on the stolen

13

vehicle which is Count One of the Information.

1*

The other counts have been taken care of by agree-

15

ment to plead guilty on the other matters, and that's what

16

the verdict form will deal with, and the jury instructions

17

will go with you and any exhibits that are to be sent into

18

the jury room.

19
20

(Whereupon, the"jury exited the courtroom.)
THE COURT: ^The record will reflect that the Court

21

is in session

22

retired to commence its deliberations.

out of the presence of the jury.

23

Counsel has a motion.

24 I

M S . HYDE:

25

The jury has

Your Honor, for the record, I'd like to

state the reasons for my objection to the prosecutor's

34

1

rebuttal remarks and move for a mistrial based on that.

2

Your Honor, I believe that the prosecutor's

3

remarks argued essentially future dangerousness of this

4

individual, that what he :did was t:o throw .out this factor

5

that Mr. .Carlson -was going to

6

if they did not find him guilty, and I think that that is

7

inappropriate to do, and I think that it is not commenting

8

on the evidence.

9

that and it is entirely inappropriate.: It-gives the jurors

be stealing one of their cars

There's nothing in.the evidence to suggest

10

grounds which are not .legal ,grounds to convict and it also

tt

arouses their .fear.and their-hostility to be.given a

12

painted a picture of this man committing crimes against them

13

if they do not convict.

14
15

—

Based on that, your Honor, I would ask for a new
trial.

16

THE COURT:

The mot ion1.s denied.

The Court finds

17

that the argument was a reasonable inference of the facts

18

presented in the case and the argument w a s , -although a little

19

pointed, was not unduly inflammatory, nor did it, in the

20

Court's opinion, arouse the passion or the prejudice of the

21

jury.

22

Court's in recess*

23

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.

24

THE COURT: -The.record .will reflect the presence

25

of the jury, the defendant and counsel for the defendant.

35

$^$£^

